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TCCs are seen to be a procurement model capable of achieving value for money through aligning 
the objectives of the parties to reduce costs. The use of Target Cost Contracts (TCCs) within the 
UK construction industry has increased dramatically over the past few years.  TCCs have been 
employed successfully on recent large scale projects such as Heathrow Terminal 5, Crossrail 
Procurement Strategy and the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Infrastructure.  Due 
to the success of TCCs over recent years, many clients are now turning to them in a bid to obtain 
value for money.  However, it seems that they do not always drive parties to minimise costs and 
provide value for money.  This research paper investigates the extent to which TCCs promote 
collaborative behaviours and provide value for money within the UK construction industry.  More 
particularly, the research explores the following: which projects TCCs should be used on and 
how the maturity of the design when agreeing the target cost can affect value for money;  how 
setting both the target cost and the pain/gain mechanism can affect the incentivisation of the 
contractor to minimise costs; the extent to which TCCs promote collaboration between the 
contractor, client and supply chain; and what is required to manage a TCC post-contract to ensure 
that incentivisation is maintained.  It has become apparent from the research that TCCs are 
complex procurement models which require extensive consideration and management to ensure 
parties are incentivised to minimise costs.  The research reveals that although TCCs can promote 
collaborative behaviours and provide value for money, there is a prerequisite to doing so: 
developing and managing the TCC correctly to ensure that the objectives of the parties are 
aligned.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Incentivisation contracts have long been used in the UK 
construction industry in order to align the objectives of the 
parties to a construction contract to achieve better performance.  
A TCC is a type of incentive contracting commonly used on 
projects within the UK construction industry.  TCCs seek to 
align the objectives of the parties which helps create a 
collaborative environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000).  
TCCs were created for use on large infrastructure projects 
which were complex and high risk due to unknown ground 
conditions (Heaphy, 2011).  Due to their success on these 
projects their use has grown year on year with standard TCC 
forms of contract such as the NEC options C and D being 
established.   
TCCs are associated with reimbursable contracts as the 
contractor is reimbursed the actual defined costs incurred in 
carrying out the works.  However, unlike reimbursable 
contracts, the financial risks of projects are shared by both the 
contractor and client through the use of a pain/gain mechanism.  
A pain/gain mechanism is employed so that any underspend or 
overspend against the pre-agreed contractual target cost is 
shared between the parties.  If the actual costs are lower than 
the target, the client and contractor will share the savings based 
on the pre-agreed share ratio.  Conversely, if the actual costs 
exceed the target, both parties will share any overspend based 
on the pre-agreed share ratio.  The sharing of risk through the 
pain/gain mechanism should actively encourage parties to 
collaborate to manage and reduce costs to a minimum 
(Lewedon, n.d. & RICS, 2014).  
During recent years, TCCs have become increasingly popular 
within the UK construction industry as clients look to obtain 
value for money through incentivising contractors (RICS, 
2017).  The UK Government Construction Strategy recognises 
TCCs as a cost led procurement model capable of producing the 
15-20% cost savings required for public sector construction 
projects by 2015 (Cabinet Office, 2012).  TCCs have 
successfully provided value for money on a variety of recent 
major projects such as Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, Crossrail 
Procurement Strategy and the 2012 Olympic and Paralympics 
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Games Infrastructure.  However, they have also proved 
unsuccessful on other projects.  Within AMEC v Secretary of 
State for Defence (2013), value for money was not achieved 
and disputes arose over who was liable to pay cost overruns 
above the Guaranteed Maximum Price Target Cost (RPC, 
2013).  
Although it is understood that TCCs in theory should reduce 
costs through aligning the objectives of the parties, often 
clients are disillusioned with the financial outcome of TCCs.  
As the popularity of TCCs has grown in the UK construction 
industry, clients are questioning whether they really do 
provide value for money.  It seems that it is only in certain 
circumstances where prerequisites are met, that TCCs promote 
collaboration and provide value for money.  Clients need to be 
fully aware of the implications of TCCs and the requirements 
to provide value for money prior to using them. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The overall research aim is to investigate the extent to which 
TCCs promote collaborative behaviours and provide value for 
money in the UK construction industry.  The objectives of this 
research are: to explore which projects are suitable for use with 
a TCC and how the development of design can affect value for 
money when agreeing the target cost; analyse how setting the 
target cost and pain/gain mechanism can affect the 
incentivisation of the contractor to reduce costs; analyse 
whether TCCs promote collaboration between the client and 
contractor, and the whole supply chain; and to explore what is 
required to manage a TCC post-contract award to maintain 
incentivisation.  
In order to achieve the aim of this research paper, the 
methodology included a literature review of a large body of 
existing literature.  The pre-existing literature has been 
examined and analysed to build the argument that TCCs do 
promote collaboration and provide value for money, but only 
when parties fully understand the contract process. 
 
2. Critical Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This part of the research paper has been split into four sections.  
The first section looks at which projects are appropriate for 
TCCs and how the level of design at the time the target cost is 
agreed influences value for money.  The second section looks 
at how setting the target cost itself and the pain/gain mechanism 
can influence value for money through aligning the objectives 
of the parties.  The third section looks at the extent to which 
TCCs can influence collaboration.  The final section explores 
what is required post-contract award to ensure that 
collaboration and incentivisation are maintained to achieve 
value for money. 
2.2 Value for Money in Target Cost Contracts 
TCCs intend to promote collaboration and provide value for 
money through incentivising the contractor to control costs.  
The main constituents of TCCs include the target cost, the fee 
and the share formula (Perry & Thompson, 1982).  The target 
cost is agreed between both parties normally through a 
competitive procedure and should reflect a best estimate of 
likely outturn costs to deliver the scope of work.  The fee covers 
overheads and profit for the contractor and is normally a fixed 
percentage.  The share formula introduces the incentive into the 
contract by determining how any savings or cost overruns 
against the target cost will be shared between the parties.  
Scottish Futures Trust [SFT] (2016, p30), within their review 
of Scottish public sector procurement, state that “the principle 
benefit of target cost arrangements is their ability to align the 
objectives of the parties, which helps to create a partnering 
environment”.  Further, they argue that as objectives are 
aligned, the parties are encouraged to work together to control 
costs, sharing the risk through the pre-agreed pain/gain 
mechanism.   
In order to achieve value for money on any project, the most 
appropriate contract needs to be selected.  A study of the use of 
TCCs was undertaken by Perry and Thompson (1982) within 
the CIRIA 85 report which is still very influential within the 
field today.  Within this report, they identify that high risk 
projects where costs are likely to escalate are appropriate for 
TCCs.  This is because TCCs offer more flexibility in terms of 
change than typical fixed priced contracts.  Broome (1999), 
who has provided influential literature on TCCs, agrees with 
Perry and Thompson that TCCs are appropriate for projects 
when a high level of design change is anticipated and thus 
flexibility is required.   It is also suggested by various sources 
that TCCs are not suitable for low value contracts as they 
contain the burden of high administrative costs through the use 
of unfamiliar administrative procedures such as open book 
accounting (Broome, 1999; Lewedon, n.d.; Hughes & 
Gruneberg, 2009).   Therefore, for smaller projects with 
minimal to medium levels of risk, clients should look to use 
alternative contracting models to provide value for money. 
Within the literature, there is no general consensus on how 
defined the scope of works/design needs to be at the point the 
target cost is calculated.  Various sources suggest that TCCs can 
be useful and may be the most appropriate contract where the 
extent of work to be carried out has not been fully defined 
(Broome, 1999; McInnis, 2001; Fenwick Elliot, 2016).  The 
reason behind this argument is that a target cost can be agreed 
based on an initial specification and can be amended following 
confirmation of the final specification following contract 
award.   Heaphy (2011) recognises that as work can commence 
based on an initial design and target cost, earlier starts on site 
can be achieved when compared with traditional lump-sum 
contracts.  This can provide value for money to the client as the 
project should in theory finish earlier if a TCC is selected over 
a lump-sum contract.   
Conversely, a different view established within the literature is 
that value for money will only be secured if the contract is let 
with a well-defined target cost to enable the contractor to be 
able to price the works accurately (SFT, 2016; Lewedon, n.d.; 
International Law Office, 2003).  Rawlinson (2007) agrees with 
this viewpoint that value for money is not achieved on 
insufficiently defined projects.  He suggests that TCCs should 
be used on well-defined projects with a full set of works 
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information as loosely defined projects provide the contractor 
with the opportunity to renegotiate the target cost through 
design amendments.   Research undertaken by Tirole (1986) 
demonstrates that contractors will be less incentivised to 
minimise costs if there are future opportunities to renegotiate 
the target cost.  Brumm (1992) further develops this viewpoint, 
suggesting that TCCs in fact incentivise contractors to propose 
frequent modifications in order to increase the target instead of 
reducing actual costs.  Where this is the case value for money 
will be significantly compromised. 
Drawing on the research, it needs to be recognised that a 
sufficient level of design does need to be defined to allow a 
target cost to be agreed which reflects a best estimate of likely 
outturn costs.  Although Broome (1999) suggests that TCCs are 
suitable for contracts where the extent of work is not fully 
designed, he does highlight that the scope of work still needs to 
be ‘sufficiently’ developed.  If the scope of work is 
insufficiently developed, then the contractor will have 
numerous opportunities to renegotiate the target cost and may 
subsequently focus their efforts on increasing the target to 
maximise gain-share potential rather than creating efficiencies.  
Moreover, TCCs which involve large amounts of scope change 
present significant risks to the client in terms of value for 
money.  This is because if the scope and value of contract 
changes significantly so that changes are assessed 
retrospectively, then TCCs can easily become fully 
reimbursable contracts (Broome, 1999). Value for money is not 
achieved on reimbursable contracts as the contractor is not 
incentivised to control costs.  Therefore, although the design 
does not need to be complete, clients should ensure that they 
have an adequate level of design to enable a target cost to be set 
that, although may need firming up as the design is finalised, 
will not require drastic changes.   
Furthermore, value for money can also be affected on TCCs by 
reduced quality standards as a consequence of contractors 
trying to minimise costs to increase gain-share potential.  
Kwawu and Laryea (2013) argue that with cost often being the 
biggest element of risk in contracting, incentivisation contracts 
tend to focus on cost which impacts other areas of the project.  
Both quality and time become less important than completing 
under the target cost and subsequently these aspects of TCCs 
can be neglected.  Contractors may look to rush work, reduce 
quality of materials or use in-experienced and cheaper 
resources to minimise costs.  In the long term this can affect 
value for money due to higher maintenance and repair costs.  To 
the contrary, Perry and Thompson (1982) and McInnis (2001) 
argue that quality and time are also principle elements which 
clients wish to control through the use of TCCs.  This is because 
in order to minimise costs, contractors are incentivised to 
complete on time and to maintain quality standards through 
minimising defects.  As pre-completion defects form part of the 
defined cost, but do not constitute an increase to the target cost, 
the contractor is incentivised to keep defects to a minimum to 
increase gain-share potential (Fenwick Elliot, 2016).  
Therefore, although cost is the main focus, both time and 
quality should not be adversely impacted as a result of using 
TCCs. 
2.3 Setting the Target Cost & Pain/Gain Mechanism 
The target cost and pain/gain mechanism are fundamental in 
aligning the objectives of the parties and driving the right 
behaviours to reduce costs and obtain value for money.  It is 
therefore vital that clients understand the implications of setting 
target costs and pain/gain mechanisms.   
Target Costs 
Within his paper to the Society of Construction Law, Heaphy 
(2011, p.1) a partner at EC Harris Law firm, defines a target 
cost as a “genuine pre-estimate of the most likely outturn cost 
for the project, as defined in the contract documentation”.  
Target costs need to reflect the best estimate of probable cost in 
order to offer a genuine incentive to the contractor (Perry & 
Thompson, 1982).  A realistic target cost plays an essential role 
in ensuring the opportunity to achieve savings that will benefit 
both parties (Pinsent Masons, 2016 & Fenwick Elliot, 2016).  It 
is argued that TCCs will only provide value for money when 
the target cost is set at a level that requires the client and 
contractor to collaborate to create efficiencies which are beyond 
those that are normally expected (SFT, 2016 & Heaphy, 2011).   
When setting the target cost, there are various issues that clients 
need to consider.  The following figure illustrates three different 
scenarios that can occur when setting target costs.  
Figure 1. – Setting the Target Cost (Heaphy, 2011, p.4) 
In scenario 1 in figure 1, in order to win the contract the 
contractor provides a target cost (tender) which is below a 
genuine estimate for likely outturn costs (annotated in red).  
Once the contractor is awarded the contract, they will look to 
increase the target so that it reflects likely outturn costs 
(annotated in red) or even above through variations and claims.  
The high number of variations and claims will cause adversarial 
relationships between the parties to develop and will distract 
both parties from focusing on creating efficiencies.  The 
additional administration costs in preparing and assessing 
variations and claims will increase actual costs and 
subsequently reduce value for money.  Moreover, Rawlinson 
(2007) suggests that if the target is too low, the contractor may 
look to seek to recover costs through alternative methods other 
than raising the target.  Rawlinson states that a contractor may 
look to increase actual costs above the target cost in order to 
recover costs through additional fee.  It also needs to be 
recognised that some contractors are motivated to secure 
certainty of yield on TCCs by increasing the value of fee when 
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negotiating the target (Perry & Barnes, 2000).  Consequently, 
clients need to assess both the level of fee and the target cost in 
order to ensure value for money. 
In addition, some clients believe they are gaining value for 
money by beating down target costs.  However, in reality, doing 
so removes any incentivisation for the contractor to control 
costs (Fenwick Elliot, 2016).  In fact, Perry & Thompson 
(1982) suggest that beating down the target results in the 
removal of positive behaviours from the contractor and 
promotes the wrong behaviours.   Subsequently, instead of 
aiming to lower the target cost as much as possible which can 
damage relationships, clients should ensure that the target cost 
reflects a best estimate of likely outturn costs.  Scenario 2 in 
figure 1 shows a target cost which represents a best estimate of 
likely outturn cost.  With a genuine target that reflects the scope 
of work, the contractor can focus on creating efficiencies to 
increase potential gain-share.  Value for money is likely to be 
obtained in scenario 2 as both parties are focusing on creating 
efficiencies.  
Scenario 3 in figure 1 however will not provide value for money 
to the client.  In this scenario, the target cost agreed does not 
represent a best estimate of likely outturn cost (annotated in red) 
as it is overinflated.  Wamuziri and Seywright (2005) recognise 
that creating efficiencies on TCCs is not the only way 
contractors can maximise their payoff.  They suggest that 
seeking an inflated target, illustrated in scenario 3, helps 
maximise payoff.  Clients need to be wary of inflated target 
costs as they remove any incentive for the contractor to create 
efficiencies and subsequently impair value for money.  Inflated 
targets may reward the contractor through gain-share for 
ordinary or poor performance, completing the work at the 
expected outturn cost or even above (Heaphy, 2011). 
Furthermore, in order to achieve value for money on TCCs, 
clients require sufficient knowledge and experience to be able 
to accurately estimate the likely outturn costs of the project 
(Designing Buildings Wiki, 2017).   Fisher (1969) in his 
evaluation of incentive contracting in the defence sector 
recognises that more accurate methods of determining target 
costs will increase value for money potential rather than 
elaborative incentive sharing arrangements.  In order to obtain 
an accurate target cost, clients need “good cost reporting 
information systems from historical projects, improved costs 
analysis and estimating capability” (Wamuziri & Seywright, 
2005).  In addition, in order to ensure the target is robust, clients 
should seek to use experts to challenge the costs provided by 
the contractor (Heaphy, 2011). 
Pain / Gain Share 
Heaphy (2011) and SFT (2016) both recognise that the 
pain/gain mechanism is the key driver in achieving value for 
money and contractor efficiency in TCCs.  The pain/gain 
mechanism is tantamount in aligning the objectives of the 
parties to reduce costs and therefore it is essential that clients 
understand the implications of setting the pain/gain mechanism 
(Heaphy, 2011).   Within the literature, there is no general 
consensus on the ideal sharing ratio to achieve value for money.  
Weitzman (1980) suggests that the optimal sharing ratio 
depends on the contractor’s ability to reduce costs, risk aversion 
and project uncertainty.  
The most common share ratio adopted is a straight 50/50 split 
between the contractor and client.  A large body of research 
advocates that clients should avoid setting the contractor’s 
share at less than 50% as this removes any incentivisation for 
the contractor to control costs (Weitzman, 1980; Perry & 
Barnes, 2000; T. Williams, M. Williams & Ryall, 2013; 
Broome, 1999; & Heaphy, 2011).  The reason being is that 
contractors will not be incentivised to create efficiencies if 
savings are not shared on an equal basis (Pinsent Masons, 
2016).  If a share percentage less than 50% is allocated to the 
contractor, they may look to increase the target cost to 
maximise pay off instead of focusing on creating efficiencies.  
Heaphy (2011) also argues that the straight 50/50 split is the 
simplest share method that helps to drive partnering behaviours 
as the risk is shared equally.  If the share formula is weighted 
in favour of one party, then the incentive power can be effected 
as parties are not seen to be working equally (T. Williams, M. 
Williams & Ryall, 2013).   
Research undertaken by Wood (2005), within an RICS research 
paper which involved interviews with 10 national contractors, 
highlights examples of TCCs where clients had implemented 
unfair sharing mechanisms which were considered to contradict 
the spirit of partnering.  Within the research, one contractor 
provided an example of where all underspend against the target 
cost was allocated to the client.  Where this is the case, the 
contractor will not be incentivised to create efficiencies and 
consequently both collaboration and value for money will be 
jeopardised.   
When considering a straight 50/50 split, clients need to 
determine the contractor’s potential to reduce costs.   Weitzman 
(1980) argues that where the contractor has great potential to 
reduce costs through contributing to the development of the 
design, then they should benefit from a share ratio above 50%.  
To the contrary, Broome (2002) believes that if there is limited 
potential for the contractor to provide large costs savings then 
the split should also be above 50% to motivate contractors.  
Although clients need to ensure that contractors have the 
potential to reduce costs, they also need to ensure that the 
potential is limited in order to motivate the contractor to create 
efficiencies which are beyond those normally expected.   To 
create efficiencies beyond those normally expected, clients 
should ensure that value engineering has been undertaken prior 
to agreeing the target cost and share ratio.   
Clients also need be aware of the potential ability of other 
stakeholders to reduce costs.  Perry and Thompson (1982) 
suggest that the engineer or designer has a considerable 
influence on the execution of a contract and subsequently can 
affect the ability of a contractor to meet a target.  Subsequently, 
Perry and Thompson (1982) suggest that engineers are linked 
into the pain/gain mechanism.  However, T. Williams, M. 
Williams and Ryall (2013) argue that linking numerous parties 
into the pain/gain mechanism contractually can be complex and 
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time consuming which can reduce value for money.  It is 
therefore advisable that clients should only look to include 
designers and subcontractors into the sharing mechanism if 
they have a substantial potential to reduce costs, otherwise 
value for money could be compromised. 
Moreover, although most contractors will usually request a 
share ratio above 50%, this is not always the case.  This is 
because a straight 50/50 split can affect a contractor’s profit 
margin if the actual costs far exceed the target (Perry and 
Thompson, 1982).  Therefore, on high risk projects, contractors 
may not want to bear the risk associated with a 50% split, 
especially where the contractor’s potential to control costs is 
limited.  Enforcing a 50% split on a high risk project, where the 
contractor has limited potential to control costs will result in 
less value for money.  This is because the target cost will be 
inflated with risk due to cost uncertainty.  In addition, the 
contractor will look to renegotiate the target cost through claims 
and variations in order to further reduce his risk of overspend.  
Subsequently, when setting the share ratio, client’s need to 
consider the contractors risk aversion as implementing a high 
ratio could significantly impair value for money depending on 
the organisation. 
Broome (1999), within his previous research has advocated that 
the contractor’s share not be less than 50%.  Despite this and 
contrary to the views of others (Weitzman, 1980; Heaphy, 
2011; Perry and Barnes, 2000), Broome (2013) now suggests 
that this may not always be the case.  Developing on his 
previous research, Broome (2013) now suggests that where the 
client is larger than the contractor and is better able to carry the 
risk, then the cost overrun above a certain percentage should 
entirely lie with the client.  Alternatively, if the contractor is a 
large organisation, then it may be advisable to cap the over run 
at 100% to the contractor as they have the financial capacity to 
bear the risk (Broome, 2013).  Where the over spend is fully 
allocated to the contractor the contract becomes a guaranteed 
maximum price (GMP) contract.  It needs to be recognised that 
where there is a GMP, once the contractor is perceived to 
complete the project above the target cost, the client will be 
substantially less motivated to reduce costs (Broome and Perry, 
2002).  Where this happens, collaboration and value for money 
will be impaired as disputes are likely to arise if the contractor 
feels they are entitled to an increase to the target cost to limit 
their pain exposure.  
Clients also need to consider whether they intend to work with 
the same contractor in the future on similar projects.  Wood 
(2005) suggests that clients who are going to work with 
contractors on future schemes tend to be more generous when 
setting the share ratio because of the potential to replicate any 
savings on subsequent projects.  Increasing the contractor’s 
share will incentivise the contractor to create efficiencies on the 
first project which will benefit the client in terms of value for 
money on future schemes. 
It can be concluded from the research that setting the share ratio 
is complex and requires a substantial amount of consideration.  
Clients need to provide sufficient time to review the impact of 
different share ratios in order to ensure that the optimum share 
ratio is employed that aligns the objectives of the parties to 
provide value for money. 
2.4 Collaboration in Target Cost Contracts 
Collaboration is a key success factor in ensuring value for 
money is achieved on projects.  There is a strong consensus in 
the existing literature suggesting that TCCs promote 
collaboration in projects.  Various studies (Perry & Thompson, 
1982; Heaphy, 2011; Broome, 1999) highlight that the principle 
benefit of target cost arrangements is their ability to align the 
objectives of the parties, which helps create a partnering 
environment and a resulting identity of interest.  Further studies 
(Hughes, T. Williams & Zhaomin, 2012; Constructing 
Excellence, 2011; Bresnen & Marshall, 2000) also suggest that 
target cost arrangements deliver value for money through 
creating a collaborative working environment by aligning the 
objectives of the parties.  The contractor is aligned to the 
client’s objective to minimise costs in order to increase their 
profit margin. 
Conversely, research undertaken by T. Williams, M. Williams 
and Ryall (2013), which involved interviews with industry 
professionals who have experience managing TCCs, disagrees 
with this general consensus by suggesting that TCCs create a 
misalignment of objectives between the client, contractor and 
design team as parties are motivated for different things.  This 
is because the client is motivated by cost, time and quality, the 
contractor just profit and the design team just quality.  In order 
for collaboration to occur and thus value for money, clients 
need to ensure that the objectives of all key stakeholders are 
aligned.  Although the research undertaken by T. Williams, M. 
Williams and Ryall (2013) involved personnel experience of 
interviewees, and therefore does not represent all professional 
views,  the professionals interviewed had years of experience 
managing TCCs and therefore their direct experience is 
important to consider.  Therefore, in order to align the client’s 
time objective to the contractor, clients should look to use 
bonus payments or liquidated damages.  In order to incentivise 
the design team and main subcontractors to reduce costs, clients 
should include the design team and main subcontractors into the 
contractual pain/gain mechanism. 
When the objectives between parties are aligned in TCCs, they 
should reduce conflict and adversarial relationships associated 
with other types of contracts.  McInnis (2001) argues that TCCs 
promote teamwork, in replacement of the traditional adversarial 
relationships and claims conscious attitudes normally 
associated with traditional procurement methods.  Further, 
numerous studies (Kawau & Laryea, 2013; Eriksson, Atkin & 
Nilsson, 2009) argue that the sharing of risk and the high level 
of cooperation associated with TCCs reduces the occurrence 
and opportunity of conflicts and disputes occurring. 
The high level of cooperation present in TCCs stems from the 
use of open book accounting which enables trust to be built 
between the parties.  Perry and Thompson (1982) argue that the 
use of open book accounting on TCCs reduces the number of 
claims greatly and simplifies the resolution of claims that do 
occur.   The openness of information through open book 
accounting increases confidence and should lead to greater 
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collaboration through the closer alignment of motivation (Perry 
& Barnes, 2000).  In addition, as the client has access to the 
accounts and records of the contractors actual costs, agreeing 
variations is easier and less confrontational than with other 
forms of contract (Heaphy, 2011).  Heaphy also suggests that 
open book accounting will deter contractors from wasting time 
applying for claims which cannot be justified and will instead 
focus this time on seeking efficiencies, thus providing value for 
money.  Subsequently, it can be concluded that the use of open 
book accounting should in theory reduce disputes due to a 
greater level of collaboration. 
Although there is a large body of research recognising TCCs 
ability to promote collaboration, there are various sources that 
believe TCCs promote adversarial behaviours.  SFT (2016) and 
Fenwick Elliot (2016) suggest that the use of open book 
accounting can in fact cause disputes and adversarial 
behaviours to occur when the client scrutinises the contractor’s 
cost records to ensure they are valid.  As the client has access 
to the contractor’s cost records, difficulty can arise when 
agreeing variations if the contractor submits a quotation inflated 
with risk to increase the target cost and thus potential gain-
share.  Broome (1999) recognises that where this is the case, 
the objectives and motivations of the parties are not aligned.    
Similarly, T. Williams, M. Williams and Ryall (2013) agree 
with the aforementioned sources that TCCs can promote 
adversarial behaviours by suggesting there is a need for the 
contractor to be claims conscious.  This statement can be 
explained by referring back to scenario 1 in figure 1 where the 
contractor submits a low target cost to win the work.  With a 
low target, the contractor will try to increase the target cost 
through overinflated variations and claims.  Consequently, it 
can be argued that TCCs which contain low targets will 
discourage collaboration and promote adversarial relationships 
as there will be an increased number of claims and disputes put 
forward by the contractor.  Therefore, as aforementioned, it is 
imperative that target costs are not set too low as doing so will 
drive the wrong behaviours which will impair value for money.  
It is also needs to be recognised that TCCs require clear 
definitions of what is payable and disallowable under the 
contract.  If the contract does not define payable and 
disallowable costs then disputes are likely to arise.  Therefore, 
is it essential that the contract explicitly states what is payable 
in order to promote collaboration and reduce disputes and 
claims.  
It can be concluded that when the target cost and share ratio are 
set at a level which encourages the contractor to reduce costs, 
collaboration will increase due to the alignment of objectives. 
However, Rose and Manly (2010) recognise that although 
TCCs are intended to promote collaboration in the whole 
supply chain, a criticism in the published literature is that they 
only incentivise the client and contractor only.  Other sources 
(SFC, 2016 & Rawlinson, 2007) suggest that TCCs incentivise 
the contractor, subcontractors and suppliers to reduce costs and 
promote collaboration in the whole supply chain.  Although 
TCCs can incentivise all of the aforementioned parties, SFT and 
Rawlinson do not state how this can be achieved. T. Williams, 
M. Williams and Ryall (2013) recognise that to deliver a gain 
under a TCC it requires collaboration not just between the 
contractor and client but also between the consultants, sub-
contractors, design team, supply chain and manufacturers.  This 
is because TCCs do not incentivise other stakeholders to 
minimise costs if they are not linked into the share ratio.  
Subsequently, in order to incentivise the key stakeholders, who 
have a high potential to reduce costs, they need to be linked into 
the share ratio to benefit from creating efficiencies.  This will 
ensure that all key players who can affect cost performance are 
motivated to control costs, thus providing value for money. 
2.5 Managing Target Cost Contracts Post Contract Award 
The previous sections within this paper have predominantly 
focused on how pre-contract activities affect value for money 
on TCCs.  However, clients need to recognise that post-contract 
management on TCCs is essential in providing value for 
money.  Without good TCC post-contract management, 
incentivisation to control costs will be lost and value for money 
will be jeopardised.  
In order to achieve value for money, clients need to recognise 
that TCCs involve the client carrying a greater amount of risk 
than they would do with conventional priced contracts (Perry & 
Barnes, 2000).  Often, problems arise where the client does not 
realise they are carrying a greater amount of risk than compared 
with a fixed price contract.  They then do not manage this 
additional risk properly.  This can result in the target cost not 
being amended to reflect scope, and subsequently the share 
mechanism becoming invalid.  Where this occurs the contract 
may revert to an entirely reimbursable basis and value for 
money will be jeopardised (SFC, 2016).  To prevent this from 
happening, clients need to be aware that TCCs involve clients 
bearing greater risk than fixed priced contracts and therefore 
require greater amount of resources to manage post-contract.   
Furthermore, as TCCs are a complex contracting mechanism, 
which are administratively heavy, they require competent 
project managers as effective project management is a key 
instrument in ensuring benefits are realised by both parties 
(Fenwick Elliot, 2016 & Rawlinson, 2007).  A common issue 
that inhibits value for money on TCCs is recognised by Perry 
and Thompson (1982) who suggest that site personnel who lack 
proper TCC training may not understand the significance of the 
target cost and may subsequently treat and manage the contract 
as if it were reimbursable.  Further, the administrative demands 
of TCCs create a risk that the link between the target cost and 
actual cost could be lost and the client could be exposed to a 
significant transfer of risk (Rawlinson, 2007).  As a result, in 
order to maintain incentivisation and value for money potential, 
it is essential that competent professionals who have experience 
and training on how to manage TCCs are employed.  
Broome and Perry (2002) highlight that the use of open book 
accounting on TCCs places an extra burden on the client in 
terms of administration costs as additional time is required to 
assess subcontractors, types of resources and calculation of 
productivities.  Other studies (T. Williams, M. Williams and 
Ryall, 2013; Lewedon, n.d.; Chan et al, 2011) agree with 
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Broome and Perry, proposing that TCCs are often criticised for 
the additional time and cost required for administration due to 
unfamiliar administration procedures such as open book 
accounting which impair value for money.  They agree that 
greater client involvement is essential in TCCs and that 
competent professionals are required.  If good purchasing and 
post-contract management are not present on TCCs then value 
for money will be impaired as incentivisation will not be 
maintained. 
Although the previous sources referred to suggest that TCCs 
increase administration costs, Perry and Thompson (1982) 
believe that TCCs can in fact reduce administration costs in 
comparison with other procurement models.  They suggest that 
due to the improved facility for evaluating change and the 
greater collaboration between the parties, the protracted 
negotiation of claims should be reduced.  Therefore, it can be 
argued that although TCCs are resource intensive, they may 
actually be less resource intensive when compared with fixed 
priced contracts where great amounts of change are present.  
This is because open book accounting should allow for easier 
agreement of variations and the final account and should 
therefore reduce the number of disputes as compared with fixed 
priced contracts whereby the client does not have access to the 
contractor’s records. 
The most important factor in maintaining incentivisation post-
contract is to ensure that the target cost remains visible to the 
contractor.  To do so, clients need to ensure that the target is 
adjusted for variations so that it reflects the latest scope of work.  
Heaphy (2011) highlights that in order to maintain the target 
cost; changes need to be agreed as soon as they occur.  A key 
factor which is often neglected in managing TCCs is agreeing 
change as soon as it occurs.  Not agreeing change prior to or at 
the time it occurs means that the increase to the target cost will 
be based on actual costs incurred.  If the target is being 
increased based on actual costs, the contractor will not be 
incentivised to create efficiencies and the contract essentially 
becomes fully reimbursable.  Target costs which are 
unmaintained for long periods and do not reflect actual scope 
can result in the sharing mechanisms becoming invalid.  Where 
this occurs, the contract will revert to an entirely reimbursable 
basis and value for money will be impaired.   
Moreover, it is fundamental that both parties understand what 
constitutes a legitimate change to the target cost under the 
contract to reduce the potential of claims and disputes 
occurring.  The contract needs to identify the risks which the 
contractor cannot manage and are therefore at the client’s risk.  
These client’s risks need to be clearly stipulated in the contract 
documentation and if any materialise, the contractor shall be 
entitled to an increase to the target (Broome, 2002).  In addition, 
Perry and Barnes (2000) highlight that the project manager 
needs to be fair when assessing target cost adjustments as 
reliable and fair methods of target adjustments are an important 
component of successful TCCs.  They also highlight the 
importance of precise and clear definitions of actual cost and 
fee within the contract.  Doing so will reduce the administrative 
costs in time spent preparing and rejecting claims and time 
spent disallowing costs in payment applications. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In summary, this paper has investigated the extent to which 
TCCs promote collaborative behaviours and provide value for 
money in the UK construction industry.  The following part of 
the conclusion revisits the research objectives of this paper and 
summarises the findings of the research work. 
Objective 1; 
Explore which projects are suitable for use with a TCC and how 
the development of design can affect value for money when 
agreeing the target cost. The literature review has revealed that 
TCCs are favourable to provide value for money when used on 
high risk, complex and large projects where change is likely to 
occur.  The flexibility that TCCs provide will enable change to 
be administered more efficiently than if a fixed price contract is 
selected.  Value for money will be compromised when using 
TCCs on simple, low value and low risk projects due to the 
complexity of the contract and high administrative burdens. 
This paper further recognises that TCCs are useful contracting 
models for projects where the design has not yet been finalised.  
However, it has become apparent that ensuring an adequate 
level of design is completed prior to going out to the market 
will enable a contractor to provide a more accurate target cost.  
Further, the more developed the design, the fewer opportunities 
the contractor will have to renegotiate the target cost.  
Subsequently, they will be more focused on creating 
efficiencies and providing value for money rather than seeking 
to increase the target. 
Objective 2; 
Analyse how setting the target cost and pain/gain mechanism 
can affect the incentivisation of the contractor to reduce costs. 
The literature review has revealed that value for money is likely 
to be achieved on projects where the target cost is set at a level 
which reflects a genuine pre-estimate of the most likely outturn 
cost for a project.  Doing so incentivises the contractor to focus 
on creating efficiencies to increase gain-share potential.  Target 
costs that are too low and are over inflated with risk cause the 
objectives of the parties to become unaligned and thus value for 
money will be impaired. 
It is evident that the pain/gain mechanism is the core driver of 
aligning the parties’ objectives to work collaboratively to 
achieve value for money.  There are a variety of share ratios 
that can be employed and the optimal share ratio depends on 
the project conditions.   The research has revealed that there is 
a strong consensus advocating that the share ratio to the 
contractor not be set any less than 50% as doing so removes 
incentivisation to reduce costs.  Further, it appears that adopting 
a straight 50/50 split may be the most desirable share ratio due 
to the simplicity and impartiality of sharing risk equally.  
However, clients need to recognise that a 50% share ratio may 
not always be the optimum share ratio to promote collaboration 
and provide value for money.  Clients need to consider the 
contractor’s ability to reduce costs, risk aversion and project 
uncertainty to ensure that the optimal share ratio is employed. 
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The research has also identified that in certain projects, it may 
be necessary to incentivise all key supply chain members 
including the design team through the pain/gain mechanism if 
they have a strong potential to reduce costs.  However, this 
paper has not analysed how far down the supply chain the share 
ratio should be employed.  It has become apparent that this is 
an area for further research and consideration. 
Objective 3; 
Analyse whether TCCs promote collaboration between the 
client and contractor, and the whole supply chain.   
The research suggests that there is a strong consensus that TCCs 
do promote collaborative behaviours: reducing conflict, 
disputes and adversarial relationships.  The literature suggests 
that collaboration prospers through the alignment of the 
objectives of the parties through the pain/gain mechanism and 
through the use of open book accounting.  However, the 
research also recognises that collaboration can be significantly 
impaired when the objectives of the parties become unaligned.  
The research suggests that TCCs promote collaborative 
behaviours when: the target cost reflects a best estimate of 
likely outturn costs; the pain/gain mechanism aligns the 
objectives of the parties; open book accounting is not abused 
through clients scrutinising cost records; the contract explicitly 
defines payable and disallowable costs; and the contract 
explicitly states what constitutes a change to the target cost.  It 
needs to be recognised that although TCCs provide the 
foundation for collaboration to prosper, collaboration still relies 
upon the willingness of personnel to co-operate.  
Furthermore, this research has highlighted that TCCs often do 
not promote collaboration throughout the supply chain.  Many 
contracts are let with only the contractor and client linked into 
the pain/gain mechanism.  It has become apparent that on 
certain projects other stakeholders have a strong potential to 
reduce costs.  Subsequently, not including these key 
stakeholders into the share mechanism drives the wrong 
behaviours and can significantly impair value for money. 
Objective 4; 
Explore what is required to manage a TCC post-contract award 
to maintain incentivisation and obtain value for money. 
It is evident that good contract management on TCCs is a 
fundamental requirement in ensuring value for money.  Clients 
need to recognise that they are bearing a greater amount of risk 
with a TCC than they would be with a fixed priced contract.  
Thus, competent resources are required to manage the contract 
and ensure that the target cost is maintained.  This involves 
agreeing change as soon as it occurs to ensure that the target 
cost reflects the scope of work and the pain/gain mechanism 
remains valid.    
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the research is 
that TCCs are a complex procurement model which are 
capable of promoting collaborative behaviours and providing 
value for money in the UK construction industry but only 
when they are developed and managed correctly to ensure that 
the objectives of the parties are aligned.  Further research and 
consideration is required on this subject in order to establish 
further how clients can align the objectives of all key parties 
to achieve value for money. 
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